The Universe is not a Computer by Wharton, Ken
ar
X
iv
:1
21
1.
70
81
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
7 J
an
 20
15
The Universe is not a Computer
Ken Wharton
Department of Physics and Astronomy, San Jose´ State University, San Jose´, CA 95192-0106
When we want to predict the future, we compute it from what we know about the present.
Specifically, we take a mathematical representation of observed reality, plug it into some dynamical
equations, and then map the time-evolved result back to real-world predictions. But while this
computational process can tell us what we want to know, we have taken this procedure too literally,
implicitly assuming that the universe must compute itself in the same manner. Physical theories
that do not follow this computational framework are deemed illogical, right from the start. But this
anthropocentric assumption has steered our physical models into an impossible corner, primarily
because of quantum phenomena. Meanwhile, we have not been exploring other models in which the
universe is not so limited. In fact, some of these alternate models already have a well-established
importance, but are thought to be mathematical tricks without physical significance. This essay
argues that only by dropping our assumption that the universe is a computer can we fully develop
such models, explain quantum phenomena, and understand the workings of our universe. (This essay
was awarded third prize in the 2012 FQXi essay contest; a new afterword compares and contrasts
this essay with Robert Spekkens’ first prize entry.)
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEWTONIAN
SCHEMA
Isaac Newton taught us some powerful and useful
mathematics, dubbed it the “System of the World”,
and ever since we’ve assumed that the universe ac-
tually runs according to Newton’s overall scheme.
Even though the details have changed, we still basi-
cally hold that the universe is a computational mech-
anism that takes some initial state as an input and
generates future states as an output. Or as Seth
Lloyd says, “It’s a scientific fact that the universe is
a big computer”.[1]
Such a view is so pervasive that only recently
has anyone bothered to give it a name: Lee Smolin
now calls this style of mathematics the “Newtonian
Schema”.[2] Despite the classical-sounding title, this
viewpoint is thought to encompass all of modern
physics, including quantum theory. This assump-
tion that we live in a Newtonian Schema Universe
(NSU) is so strong that many physicists can’t even
articulate what other type of universe might be con-
ceptually possible.
When examined critically, the NSU assumption is
exactly the sort of anthropocentric argument that
physicists usually shy away from. It’s basically the
assumption that the way we humans solve physics
problems must be the way the universe actually op-
erates. In the Newtonian Schema, we first map our
knowledge of the physical world onto some math-
ematical state, then use dynamical laws to trans-
form that state into a new state, and finally map
the resulting (computed) state back onto the phys-
ical world. This is useful mathematics, because it
allows us humans to predict what we don’t know
(the future), from what we do know (the past). But
is it a good template for guiding our most funda-
mental physical theories? Is the universe effectively
a quantum computer? This essay argues “no” on
both counts; we have erred by assuming the uni-
verse must operate as some corporeal image of our
calculations.
This is not to say there aren’t good arguments for
the NSU. But it is the least-questioned (and most
fundamental) assumptions that have the greatest po-
tential to lead us astray. When quantum experi-
ments have thrown us non-classical curveballs, we
have instinctively tried to find a different NSU to
make sense of them. Thanks to this deep bias, it’s
possible that we have missed the bigger picture: the
mounting evidence that the fundamental rules that
govern our universe cannot be expressed in terms of
the Newtonian Schema. It’s evidence that we’ve so
far found a way to fold back into an NSU, but at
2a terrible cost – and without debate or recognition
that we’ve already developed the core framework of
a promising alternative.
Section II will detail the problems that arise when
one tries to fit quantum phenomena into an NSU.
The following sections will then outline the alterna-
tive to the NSU and show how it naturally resolves
these same problems. The conclusion is that the
best framework for our most fundamental theories is
not the Newtonian Schema, but a different approach
that has been developed over hundreds of years, with
ever-growing importance to all branches of physics.
It seems astounding that we have not recognized this
alternate mathematics as a valid Schema in its own
right, but no alternative makes sense if we’ve al-
ready accepted Lloyd’s “fact” that the universe is
a (quantum) computer. Only by recognizing that
the NSU is indeed an assumption can we undertake
an objective search for the best description of our
universe.
II. CHALLENGES FROM THE QUANTUM
Until the 20th century, the evidence against the
NSU was circumstantial at best. One minor issue
was that (fundamental) classical laws can equally
well be run forward and backward – say, to retro-
dict the historical locations of planets. So there’s
nothing in the laws to imply that the universe is a
forward-running computer program, calculating the
future from some special initial input. Instead, every
moment is just as special as every other moment.
Of course, the same is true for a deterministic and
reversible computer algorithm – from the data at any
time-step, one can deduce the data at all other time-
steps. Combined with a special feature of the Big
Bang (its status as an ordered, low-entropy bound-
ary condition), this concern mostly vanishes.1
1 Although it does raise questions, such as why the laws hap-
pen to be time-symmetric, if the boundary conditions are
so time-asymmetric.
But quantum phenomena raise three major chal-
lenges to the NSU. Standard quantum theory deals
with each of them in basically the same way – by
assuming the NSU must be correct, and using suspi-
ciously anthropocentric reasoning to recast the uni-
verse in an image of our quantum calculations.
First, we have Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
(HUP). In the classical context of Heisenberg’s orig-
inal paper [3], this means we can never know the
initial state of the universe with enough precision
to compute the future. This would not alone have
challenged the NSU – a universal computer could po-
tentially use the full initial state, even if we did not
know it. But it weakens the above argument about
how the Big Bang is special, because not even the
Big Bang can beat the HUP – as confirmed by tell-
tale structure in the cosmological microwave back-
ground. The special low-entropy order in the uni-
verse’s initial state is accompanied by random, non-
special, disorder.
But conventional quantum theory rejects the
above reading of the HUP. In spirit with the NSU,
the unknown quantities are no longer even thought
to exist. Note the implication: if we humans
can’t possibly know something, then the universe
shouldn’t know it either. The Big Bang is restored as
the universe’s special “input”, and the NSU is saved.
But this step leads to new problems – namely, we
can’t use classical laws anymore, because we don’t
have enough initial data to solve them. To maintain
an NSU, we’re forced to drop down from classical
second-order differential equations to a simpler first-
order differential equation (the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion).
This leads to the second major challenge – the
Schro¨dinger equation yields the wrong output. Or
more accurately, the future that it computes is not
what we actually observe. Instead, it merely allows
us to (further) compute the probabilities of different
possible outcomes. This is a huge blow to the NSU.
Recall the three steps for the Newtonian Schema: 1)
Map the physical world onto a mathematical state,
32) Mathematically evolve that state into a new state,
and 3) Map the new state back onto the physical
world. If one insists on a universe that computes
itself via the Schro¨dinger equation, the only way to
salvage the NSU is to have step 3 be a probabilistic
map. (Even though the inverse of that map, step 1,
somehow remains deterministic.)
Once again, since we are restricted from know-
ing the exact outcome, conventional quantum the-
ory puts the same restrictions on the NSU itself. In
step 3, the story goes, not even the universe knows
which particular outcome will occur. And yet one
particular outcome does occur, at least when one
looks. Even worse, the measurement process blurs
together steps 2 and 3, affecting the state of the
universe itself in a manner manifestly inconsistent
with the Schro¨dinger equation. The question of ex-
actly where (and how) the universe stops using the
Schro¨dinger equation is the infamous “measurement
problem” of quantum theory. It becomes harder to
think of the universe as computing itself if the dy-
namical laws are not objectively defined.
So it’s perhaps unsurprising that many physi-
cists imagine an NSU that ignores step 3 altogether;
the universe is simply the computation of the ever-
evolving Schro¨dinger equation, the mismatch with
reality notwithstanding. The only consistent way to
deal with this mismatch is to take the Everettian
view that our entire experience is just some small,
subjective sliver of an ultimate objective reality – a
reality that we do not experience.[4]
Which brings us to the third challenge to the NSU:
the dimensionality of the quantum state itself. The
phenomenon of quantum entanglement – where the
behaviors of distant particles are correlated in strik-
ingly non-classical ways – seems to require a quan-
tum state that does not fit into the spacetime we
experience. The quantum state of a N-particle sys-
tem formally lives in a “configuration space” of 3N
dimensions. If the universe is the self-computation of
such a state, then we live in a universe of enormous
dimensionality. Any consistent, NSU view of quan-
tum theory (not merely the Everettians) must main-
tain that Einstein’s carefully-constructed spacetime
is fundamentally incorrect. Instead, one must hold
that Schro¨dinger accidentally stumbled onto the cor-
rect mathematical structure of the entire universe.
Of course, configuration space was not an inven-
tion of Schro¨dinger’s; it continues to be used in sta-
tistical mechanics and other fields where one does
not know the exact state of the system in question.
Poker probabilities, for example, are computed in
such a space. Only after the cards are turned face
up does this configuration space of possibilities col-
lapse into one actual reality.
In the case of cards, though, it’s clear that the un-
derlying reality was there all along – configuration
space is used because the players lack information.
In the case of a theory that underlies everything,
that’s not an option. Either the quantum state ne-
glects some important “hidden variables”, or else
reality is actually a huge-dimensional space. Con-
ventional thinking denies any hidden variables, and
therefore gives up on ordinary spacetime. Again,
note the anthropocentrism: we use configuration
spaces to calculate entangled correlations, so the uni-
verse must be a configuration space.2
The NSU becomes almost impossible to maintain
in the face of all these challenges. Treating the uni-
verse as a computer requires us to dramatically al-
ter our dynamical equations, expand reality to an
uncountable number of invisible dimensions, and fi-
nesse a profound mismatch between the “output” of
the equations and what we actually observe.
Of course, no one is particularly happy with this
state of affairs, and there are many research pro-
grams that attempt to solve each of these problems.
But almost none of these programs are willing to
throw out the deep NSU assumption that may be at
ultimate fault. This is all the more surprising given
2 Like a poker player that denies any reality deeper than
her own knowledge, imagining the face-down cards literally
shifting identities as she gains more information.
4that there is a well-established alternative to the
Newtonian Schema; a highly regarded mathemati-
cal framework that is in many ways superior. The
barrier is that practically no one takes this math-
ematics literally, as an option for how the universe
might “work”. The next sections will outline this
alternative and reconsider the above challenges.
III. THE LAGRANGIAN SCHEMA
While a first-year college physics course is almost
entirely dominated by the Newtonian Schema, some
professors will include a brief mention of Fermat’s
Principle of least time. It’s a breathtakingly sim-
ple and powerful idea (and even pre-dates Newton’s
Principia) – it just doesn’t happen to fit in with a
typical engineering-physics curriculum.
Fermat’s Principle is easy to state: Between any
two points, light rays take the quickest path. So,
when a beam of light passes through different mate-
rials from point X to point Y, the path taken will be
the fastest possible path, as compared to all other
paths that go from X to Y. In this view, the reason
light bends at an air/water interface is not because
of any algorithm-like chain of cause-and-effect, but
rather because it’s globally more efficient.
However elegant this story, it’s not aligned with
the Newtonian Schema. Instead of initial inputs
(say, position and angle), Fermat’s principle requires
logical inputs that are both initial and final (the po-
sitions of X and Y). The initial angle is no longer
an input, it’s a logical output. And instead of states
that evolve in time, Fermat’s principle is a compar-
ison of entire paths – paths that cannot evolve in
time, as they already cover the entire timespan in
question.
This method of solving physics problems is not
limited to light rays. In the 18th century, Mauper-
tuis, Euler, and Lagrange found ways to cast the rest
of classical physics in terms of a more general min-
imization3 principle. In general, the global quan-
tity to be minimized is not the time, but the “ac-
tion”. Like Fermat’s Principle, this so-called La-
grangian Mechanics lies firmly outside the Newto-
nian Schema. And as such, it comprises an alter-
nate way to do physics – fully deserving of the title
“Lagrangian Schema”.
Like the Newtonian Schema, the Lagrangian
Schema is a mathematical technique for solving
physics problems. In both schemas, one first makes
a mathematical representation of physical reality,
mapping events onto parameters. On this count,
the Lagrangian Schema is much more forgiving; one
can generally choose any convenient parameteriza-
tion without changing the subsequent rules. And
instead of a “state”, the key mathematical object
is a scalar called the Lagrangian (or in the case of
continuous classical fields, the Lagrangian density,
L), a function of those parameters and their local
derivatives.
There are two steps needed to extract physics from
L. First, one partially constrains L on the boundary
of some spacetime region (e.g., fixing X and Y in
Fermat’s Principle). For continuous fields, one fixes
continuous field parameters. But only the boundary
parameters are fixed; the intermediate parameters
and the boundary derivatives all have many possible
values at this stage.
The second step is to choose one of these possibil-
ities (or assign them probabilistic weights). This is
done by summing the Lagrangian (densities) every-
where inside the boundary to yield a single number,
the action S. The classical solution is then found by
minimizing the action; the quantum story is differ-
ent, but it’s still a rule that involves S.
To summarize the Lagrangian Schema, one sets up
a (reversible) two-way map between physical events
and mathematical parameters, partially constrains
those parameters on some spacetime boundary at
3 Actually, extremization.
5both the beginning and the end, and then uses a
global rule to find the values of the unconstrained
parameters. These calculated parameters can then
be mapped back to physical reality.
IV. NEWTON VS. LAGRANGE
There are two fairly-widespread attitudes when it
comes to the Lagrangian Schema. The first is that
the above mathematics is just that – mathematics –
with no physical significance. Yes, it may be beauti-
ful, it may be powerful, but it’s not how our universe
really works. It’s just a useful trick we’ve discovered.
The second attitude, often held along with the first,
is that action minimization is provably equivalent to
the usual Newtonian Schema, so there’s no point in
trying to physically interpret the Lagrangian Schema
in the first place.
To some extent, these two attitudes are at odds
with each other. If the two schemas are equiva-
lent, then a physical interpretation of one should
map to the other. Still, the arguments for “schema-
equivalence” need to be more carefully dismantled.
This is easiest in the quantum domain, but it’s in-
structive to first consider a classical case, such as
Fermat’s Principle.
A typical argument for schema-equivalence is to
use Fermat’s principle to derive Snell’s law of re-
fraction, the corresponding Newtonian-style law. In
general, one can show that action minimization al-
ways implies such dynamic laws. (In this context,
the laws are generally known as the Euler-Lagrange
equations.) But a dynamical law is not the whole
Newtonian Schema – it’s merely step 2 of a three-
step process. And the input and output steps differ:
Snell’s law takes different inputs than Fermat’s Prin-
ciple and yields an output (the final ray position)
that was already constrained in the action minimiza-
tion. Deriving Newtonian results from a Lagrangian
premise therefore requires a bit of circular logic.
Another way to frame the issue is to take a known
embodiment of the Newtonian Schema – a computer
algorithm – and set it to work solving Lagrangian-
style problems with initial and final constraints. The
only robust algorithms for solving such problems are
iterative4, with the computer testing multiple his-
tories, running back and forth in time. And this
sort of algorithm doesn’t sound like a universe that
computes itself – the most obvious problem being
the disconnect between algorithmic time and actual
time, not to mention the infinite iterations needed
to get an exact answer.
Still, conflating these two schemas in the classi-
cal domain where they have some modest connec-
tion is missing the point: These are still two differ-
ent ways to solve problems. And when new prob-
lems come around, different schemas suggest dif-
ferent approaches. Tackling every new problem in
an NSU will therefore miss promising alternatives.
This is of particular concern in quantum theory,
where the connection between the two schemas gets
even weaker. Notably, in the Feynman path integral
(FPI), the classical action is no longer minimized
when calculating probabilities, so it’s no longer valid
to “derive” the Euler-Lagrange equations using clas-
sical arguments.5
So what should we make of the Lagrangian
Schema formulations of quantum theory? (Namely,
the FPI and its relativistic extension, Lagrangian
quantum field theory, LQFT.) Feynman never found
a physical interpretation of the FPI that didn’t in-
volve negative probabilities, and LQFT is basically
ignored when it comes to interpretational questions.
Instead, most physicists just show these approaches
yield the same results as the more-typical Newto-
nian Schema formulations, and turn to the latter for
interpretational questions. But this is making the
same mistake, ignoring the differences in the inputs
and outputs of these two schemas. It’s time to con-
sider another approach: looking to the Lagrangian
4 As in the Gerchberg-Saxton algorithm.[5]
5 It’s only when one combines the quantum wave equations
with the probabilistic Born rule that FPI probabilities are
recovered; see the discussion of Eqn (1) in [6].
6Schema not as equivalent mathematics, but as a dif-
ferent framework that can provide new insights.
V. QUANTUM CHALLENGES IN A
LAGRANGIAN LIGHT
Section II outlined three challenges from quantum
theory, and the high cost of answering them in the
NSU framework. But what do these challenges im-
ply for an LSU ? How would the founders of quantum
theory have met these challenges if they thought the
universe ran according to the mathematics of the La-
grangian Schema – not as a computer, but rather as
a global four-dimensional problem that was solved
“all at once”? Surprisingly, the quantum evidence
hardly perturbs the LSU view at all.
The first challenge was the uncertainty principle,
but the classical LSU had this built in from the start,
because it never relied on complete initial data in the
first place. Indeed, for classical particles and fields,
there’s a perfect match between the initial data one
uses to constrain the Lagrangian and the amount of
classical data one is permitted under the HUP. In
Fermat’s principle, if you know the initial light ray
position, the HUP says you can’t know the initial
angle.
Curiously, this “perfect match” is only one-way.
The HUP allows more ways to specify the initial
data than is seemingly permitted by the Lagrangian
Schema. For example, the HUP says that one can
know the initial position or the angle of the light ray,
but Fermat’s principle only works with constrained
initial positions.
But this is not a problem so much as a suggested
research direction, evident only to a Lagrangian
mindset. Perhaps the HUP is telling us that we’ve
been too restricted in the way we’ve fixed the ini-
tial and final boundaries on classical Lagrangians.
The natural question becomes: What would hap-
pen if we required action-minimization for any HUP-
compatible set of initial and final constraints? For
classical fields, the answer turns out to be that such
constraints must be roughly quantized, matching
equations that look like quantum theory.[7]
Because the LSU doesn’t need complete initial
data to solve problems, there’s nothing wrong with
the second-order differential equations of classical
physics (including general relativity, or GR). With
this change, one can revive Heisenberg’s original in-
terpretation of the HUP, yielding a natural set of
initially-unknown “hidden variables” (such as the
ray angles in Fermat’s Principle). In simple cases [8],
at least, these hidden variables can not only explain
the probabilistic nature of the outcomes, but can
actually be computed (in hindsight, after the final
boundary becomes known). Furthermore, there’s
no longer a compelling reason to drop to the first-
order Hamiltonian equations, the standard Newto-
nian Schema version of quantum theory. And since
it’s this leap from Lagrangian to Hamiltonian that
introduces many of the deepest problems for quan-
tum gravity (the “problem of time”, etc.), there are
good reasons to avoid it if at all possible.
The Lagrangian Schema also provides a nice per-
spective on the second challenge: the failure of
Newtonian-style equations to yield specific, real-
world outcomes (without further probabilistic ma-
nipulations). Recall this was the most brutal chal-
lenge to the NSU itself, raising the still-unresolved
measurement problem and breaking the symmetry
between the past and future. But the LSU doesn’t
utilize dynamical equations, so it dodges this prob-
lem as well. The temporal outcome is not deter-
mined by an equation, it’s imposed as an input con-
straint on L. And because of the time-symmetric
way in which the constraints are imposed, there’s
no longer any mathematical difference between the
past and future; both constraints directly map to
the real world, without further manipulation. In
fact, the Lagrangian procedure of “fixing” the future
boundary looks remarkably like quantum measure-
ments, providing a new perspective on the measure-
ment problem.[9]
A common complaint at this point is that the
7above feature is a bug, in that it somehow makes
the Lagrangian Schema unable to make predictions.
After all, what we usually want to know is the out-
come B given the input A, or at least the condi-
tional probability P (Bi|A) (the probability of some
possible outcome Bi given A). But if one particular
outcome (say, B1) is itself an external constraint im-
posed on L, a logical input rather than an output,
then we can’t solve the problem without knowing
the temporal outcome. Furthermore, since in this
case B1 is 100% certain, the other possibilities (B2,
B3, etc.) can never happen, contrary to quantum
theory.
But like the NSU, this complaint conflates our use-
ful calculations with objective reality. In truth, any
particular observed event does indeed have a single
outcome, with after-the-fact 100% certainty. If we
don’t yet know that outcome, we can still imagine
fixing different outcome constraints Bi, and using L
to compute an expected joint probability P (A,Bi)
for each possibility. It’s then a simple matter to nor-
malize subject to some particular initial condition A
and generate the conditional probabilities P (Bi|A).
These probabilities live in our heads until the actual
outcome appears and show us what has been the
case all along, at which point we update our incom-
plete knowledge. This is basic Bayesian probability
(see the above poker example), and many have noted
that it is a more natural interpretation of the stan-
dard quantum “collapse”.[10, 11]
Finally, consider the challenge of quantum entan-
glement. The problem with the NSU mindset is
that it demands an input state that can compute
all possible outputs, even if we don’t know what
type of measurement will eventually be made. In N-
particle systems, the number of possible future mea-
surements goes up exponentially with N. Keeping
track of *all* possible future measurements requires
a state that lives in an enormous configuration space.
It simply doesn’t “fit” in the universe we observe, or
in Einstein’s GR.
But as we’ve seen, the NSU conflates the informa-
tion we humans need to solve a problem and the data
that must actually correspond to reality. In any par-
ticular case, a vast portion of this traditional quan-
tum state turns out to be needless – it never gets
mapped to reality and is erased by the so-called “col-
lapse”. That’s because all possible measurements
don’t occur; only the actual measurement occurs.
Once the future measurement choice is known, the
joint probabilities take on familiar forms, with de-
scriptions that have exact mathematical analogies
to cases that do fit in spacetime.[6, 12]
Which brings us to the key point: If one wants
to “fit” quantum theory into the spacetime of GR,
one must use the Lagrangian Schema, solving the
problem “all at once”. Only then can the solution
take into account the actual future measurement –
which, recall, is imposed as a boundary constraint
on L. So an LSU-minded physicist, when encounter-
ing entanglement, would have no reason to add new
dimensions. The “spooky” link between entangled
particles would merely be joint correlations enforced
by virtue of both particles contributing to the same
global action.[12]
When viewed from a Lagrangian Schema mindset,
the transition from classical to quantum phenomena
is not only less jarring, but is arguably a natural
extension. Sure, some things have to change – per-
haps extending the principle of action minimization
[7] – but they’re changes that only make sense in
an LSU, with no NSU translation. Classical physics
provided a few cases where the two Schemas seemed
to almost overlap, perhaps lulling us into a feeling
that these two approaches must always overlap. But
the fact that quantum phenomena are so incompre-
hensible in an NSU, and more natural in an LSU,
should make us consider whether we’ve been using
a deeply flawed assumption all along.
8VI. CONCLUSIONS: OUR LAGRANGIAN
UNIVERSE
The best reasons for taking the Lagrangian
Schema seriously lie in quantum theory, but there
are other reasons as well. It’s the cleanest for-
mulation of general relativity, with the automatic
parameter-independence that GR requires, and by-
passes problematic questions such as how much ini-
tial data one needs to solve the Newtonian-style ver-
sion. The LSU blends time and space together just
like GR, while the NSU has to grapple with a dy-
namic evolution that seems to single out time as
“special”. The standard model of particle physics
is not a set of dynamic equations, but is instead a
Lagrangian density, with deep and important sym-
metries that are only evident in such a framework.
Even NSU-based cosmological mysteries, such as
why causally-disconnected regions of the universe
are so similar, no longer seem as problematic when
viewed in an LSU light.
But from the computational perspective of the
NSU, any description of an LSU seems baffling and
unphysical. When trying to make sense of the LSU,
a NSU-minded physicist might ask a number of
seemingly-tough questions. Which past events cause
the future boundary constraint? How do objects in
the universe “know” what future boundary they’re
supposed to meet? Doesn’t Bell’s Theorem [13] prove
that quantum correlations can’t be caused by past
hidden variables? A close look reveals these ques-
tions are already biased – they all implicitly assume
that we live in an NSU. But without the mental-
ity that the past “causes” the future by some algo-
rithmic process, the above questions are no longer
well-posed.
Constructing a complete theory built upon the
Lagrangian Schema is a vast project, one that has
barely even begun. The necessary first step, though,
is to recognize that the NSU is an assumption, not
a statement of fact. Even then, it will be difficult to
put such a deep bias behind us completely, to distin-
guish our most successful calculations from our most
fundamental physical models. But it also wasn’t
easy to fight other anthropocentric tendencies, and
yet the Earth isn’t the center of the universe, our
sun is just one of many, there is no preferred frame
of reference. Now there’s one last anthropocentric
attitude that needs to go, the idea that the compu-
tations we perform are the same computations per-
formed by the universe, the idea that the universe is
as ‘in the dark’ about the future as we are ourselves.
Laying this attitude to one side, at least temporar-
ily, opens up a beautiful theoretical vista. We can
examine models that have no Newtonian Schema
representation, and yet nicely incorporate quantum
phenomena into our best understanding of space-
time. We can treat the universe as a global, four-
dimensional boundary-value problem, where each
subset of the universe can be solved in exactly the
same manner, with exactly the same rules. Stories
can be told about what happens between quantum
measurements, and those very measurements can be
enfolded in a bigger region, to simultaneously tell
a bigger story. And most importantly, such mod-
els will suggest further models, with alterations that
only make sense in a Lagrangian framework – per-
haps a local constraint like L=0, or treating the
Euler-Lagrange equations as just an approximation
to a fundamentally underdetermined problem.
It is these models, the balance of the evidence
suggests, that have a chance of representing how
our universe really works. Not as we humans solve
problems, not as a computer, but as something far
grander.
AFTERWORD:
ON SPEKKENS’ WINNING ESSAY
“The Universe is not a Computer” was awarded
third prize in the 2012 FQXi Essay Contest, ranked
behind other excellent essays – most notably the first
prize winner [14], written by the Perimeter Institute
9physicist Robert Spekkens. Like the above essay,
Spekkens zeroed in on how most physical theories
are framed using a states-plus-dynamics Newtonian
Schema, although with a different focus and conclu-
sion. With these essays now being presented in the
same volume, this afterword is an opportunity to
compare and constrast these two viewpoints.
Spekkens’ essay begins by noting that physical
theories generally are divided into “dynamics” (laws
that implement time evolution) and “kinematics”
(the space of physical states permitted by a theory).
These, of course, are the key components of any
theory that falls under the Newtonian Schema, de-
scribed above. After noting how very different the-
ories are framed in precisely this manner, Spekkens’
essay states that physicists “typically agree that any
proposal must be described in these terms”.
Both of our essays are in general agreement that
it is this framing of physical theories, in terms of
dynamics+kinematics, that contains a widespread
mistaken assumption – but we are in disagreement
as to the precise nature of the mistake. Spekkens’
essay makes the excellent point that seemingly-
different theories (which postulate different kinemat-
ics and dynamics) can in fact be empirically indistin-
guishable when these two components are taken to-
gether. I agree with Spekkens that two such theories
should not be viewed as competitive explanations
but rather as essentially identical. (One possible les-
son for theorists might be that they are proposing
too many different theories, and can focus on a bare
few.)
On the other hand, the above essay argues that
theorists have been far too conservative in postu-
lating different theories, in that they almost exclu-
sively are couched in the Newtonian Schema. One
can make a case that framing theories in terms of
kinematics + dynamics is more an instinctive habit
than a well-thought-out “agreement”, and that new
Lagrangian-schema approaches are needed. The
mistake, in this view, is that the kinematics + dy-
namics framework is too restrictive, not too permis-
sive.
These different conclusions are not mutually ex-
clusive. Take Spekkens’ example of how classical
physics can be couched in terms of forces and New-
ton’s laws (on one hand) and Hamiltonian dynamics
(on the other). These two theories are indeed empiri-
cally indistinguishable, and should not be thought of
as essentially different. But they also both fall under
the Newtonian Schema. It is notable that classical
Lagrangian mechanics does not specify any dynam-
ics, and therefore lies in a different category of theory
altogether (a category unaddresed in Spekkens’ es-
say). In this sense, our essays are both making the
case that Newtonian Schema theories are more sim-
ilar than they might appear, and the above essay is
making the additional case that Lagrangian Schema
theories are different and under-explored.
One counterpoint to this claim might be to note
that Lagrangian Schema theories can also be ex-
pressed in terms of dynamics + kinematics; namely,
there are no dynamical laws, and the allowed kine-
matical “states” are merely four-dimensional histo-
ries that obey certain restrictions. In other words,
Lagrangian Schema theories are all kinematics, no
dynamics.
Might Spekkens’ claim for empirical indistin-
guishability perhaps be extended to apply to La-
grangian Schema theories as well, showing them to
all be essentially equivalent to a class of Newto-
nian Schema counterparts? After all, classical La-
grangianmechanics is empirically equivalent to New-
tonian mechanics (if leaving aside the input/output
differences discussed above), and the probabilities
generated by the Feynman path integral are em-
pirically equivalent to the probabilities generated
by the combination of the Schro¨dinger equation
and the Born Rule [6]. Combined with the many
inter-Newtonian-Schema examples in Spekkens’ es-
say, this may make it seem like such an argument
might be successfully developed.
But the essential differences between three-
dimensional states governed by dynamics and four-
10
dimensional “histories” with no dynamics is far
more dramatic than these examples imply. Indeed,
counter-examples have recently been published [15,
16] demonstrating simple Lagrangian Schema toy
models with no dynamical counterpart whatsoever.
And far from being some unimportant curiosity, it is
this precise style of model that most naturally maps
to the very quantum phenomena that defy Newto-
nian Schema explanations.
For example, consider the discussion concerning
kinematical- and dynamical-locality in Spekkens’ es-
say. There, the point was that since fully-local New-
tonian Schema accounts run afoul of the Bell in-
equalities, trying to rescue kinematical locality was
essentially impossible: Any such theory would neces-
sarily have dynamical nonlocality, and would there-
fore always be empirically indistinguishable from a
theory with kinematical nonlocality. But in the case
of the Lagrangian Schema, there is no dynamics, lo-
cal, nonlocal, or otherwise. The promise of rescu-
ing kinematical locality (as discussed in section V)
is now far more than just an empty redefinition of
terms – indeed, it is one of the primary motivations
for pursuing Lagrangian Schema explanations in the
first place.
So despite my general agreement with almost ev-
erything in Spekkens’ winning essay, that essay is
still framed in the Newtonian Schema mindset that
is arguably a deep and mistaken assumption in its
own right. The claim in Spekkens’ abstract that “A
change to the kinematics of a theory... can be com-
pensated by a change to its dynamics without em-
pirical consequence” is not always true when there
are no dynamics in the original theory (as per the
counter-examples in [15, 16]). Still, since it does ap-
pear that this claim is true for Newtonian Schema
theories, Spekkens’ essay will hopefully help to focus
the debate where it is needed: not between empiri-
cally indistinguishable Newtonian Schema explana-
tions of quantum phenomena, but rather between
dynamical and “all at once” explanatory accounts
of our universe.
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